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We introduce the predictive processing account of body representation, according to which 
body representation emerges via a domain-general scheme of (long-term) prediction error 
minimisation. We contrast this account against one where body representation is underpinned 
by domain-specific systems, whose exclusive function is to track the body. We illustrate how 
the predictive processing account offers considerable advantages in explaining various 
empirical findings, and we draw out some implications for body representation research. 
 
1. Predictive Processing and Body Representation 
 
Finding inspiration from a diverse number of fields such as cybernetics, neurobiology, and 
computational psychiatry, predictive processing accounts paint the mind as a neural 
mechanism whose function is the minimisation of surprise over the long-term average (for 
introductory statements, see, e.g., Hohwy, 2013; Clark, 2016; Hohwy, 2020). Here, we will 
present the predictive processing account of body representation, by recounting the 
framework from the point of view of a single organism, preoccupied with minimising its 
surprise as best it can. 
 
A biological being, be it a relatively simple organism like E.coli, or a more complex 
organism like a human, exists for a period of time, and then it ceases to exist, at the end of its 
life. As long as an organism exists, it will tend to occupy only a limited subset of all the 
possible states it could occupy (for example, humans occupy certain states on land, and rarely 
in water or in the sky, and E.coli tend to occupy states within a certain temperature range). In 
contrast, when an organism ceases to exist, it will begin to decompose and thereby its 
remnants will begin to disperse across many different states. This means that, given the kind 
of organisms we are, it would be surprising to see a living human under water or in space, 
and unsurprising to see it occupy our familiar, land-based, environments. Similarly, it would 
be surprising to find E.Coli in environments much hotter than 70˚ C. It follows from this 
trivial observation that organisms, like humans and E.coli, must be able to avoid surprising 
states, or to minimise surprise, given the kind of organisms they are. Otherwise, they simply 
would not be in existence. Notice that here ‘surprise’ is defined relative to the type of 
organism, such that what is surprising to one may not be surprising to another (and surprise is 
a statistical construct unrelated to psychological surprise, such as surprise parties and jump 
scares). This implies that any organism must somehow be able to form beliefs about which 
environments are surprising and which are familiar, and then act in the world to avoid the 
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Predictive processing can now be motivated through this foundational idea of surprise 
minimisation. The organism needs to know which states are surprising and which are not. 
The problem is that it cannot know this in advance of encountering any state; this is because 
the organism cannot not know (in advance) all the states that there are and where it should 
(most likely) be found among them. In order to minimise surprise, then, it must do something 
else than directly try to assess surprise. It turns out that if the organism assumes a model of 
what its expected states are, such that any states that differ from that assumed model will 
appear to be unexpected, or surprising, then it can test predictions generated from this model; 
doing so will, over some period of continuous trial-and-error testing, help it reduce the real 
surprise that it cannot directly assess.  
 
The assumed model is a representation of states of the world, and how those states generate 
particular sensory input. For humans the model would be harboured internally, in the brain;  
for this reason it is often labelled an internal generative model. Technically, this idea is based 
on developments in physics and machine learning, related to the formal notion of a 
probabilistic divergence between the assumed model’s predictions and the sensory input to 
the organism, which mathematically must bound the real surprise (for descriptions of the 
formal background, see Bogacz, 2017; Buckley et al., 2017; Wiese and Metzinger, 2017; 
Hohwy, 2020).  
 
For present purposes, the important aspect is that as part of this trial-and-error process, the 
organism can update the elements of its model, in light of the sensory input, with a view to 
receive less input that contradicts that model’s predictions (e.g., if you predict you will have a 
cup of tea but have run out, then you may revise the model to predict you will have a cup of 
coffee). Alternatively, it can stick to the model’s predictions and seek to plan and execute 
actions that selectively lead to sensory input that confirms the model’s predictions (e.g., if 
your model makes you expect that you eat every day, and specifies that you tend to eat cake, 
you may act in the world to make that prediction come true, by baking). 
 
Starting from this simple story about existence, the main components of predictive processing 
are then lined up. From the assumed model of the expected states of the world, predictions 
about sensory input can be generated, which can be tested against the actual sensory input. 
The difference between the prediction and the input is the prediction error. The basic idea 
then is that the organism can help itself to avoid surprising states by keeping track of the 
prediction error it encounters, given its assumed model. And if the system is going to 
maintain a good model that rarely encounters surprising states, it should work to keep the 
prediction error as low as possible, over the long-term average.  
 
Organisms that are overly openminded and change and revise their model in the light of any 
sensory input they encounter will cease quickly (“I am encountering dangerous tigers, tigers 
must be part of my expected states”). Similarly, organisms that are overly closeminded will 
never change their model and will at best selectively sample only the states they expect, and 
they will also cease to exist quickly, since the world may not cooperate with their prior 
assumptions (“I expect to win the lottery, so I will spend all my money on lottery tickets”). In 
other words, organisms that exist for some period of time need to minimise their prediction 
error, but in a way that balances revision of the model, that is, perception and memory, to 
enable meaningful selective sampling, that is, action. Predictive processing then involves a 
delicate maintenance of two components: perceptual inference of the states of the world and 
active inference of the best plans (or ‘policies’) for action. 
 
Organisms that perceive and act via perceptual and active inference have to rely on what their 
assumed model says, that is, on their prior beliefs (in the probabilistic sense of ‘beliefs’ as 
probability distributions or density functions with a mean and a variance). These beliefs give 
the content of the organism’s representations and in humans are organized in a cortical 
hierarchy, ordered on the spatiotemporal scale over which the represented states unfold (for 
example, the visual input as you look out the car window transition over the time scale of 
seconds, and your states of hunger and thirst transitions over several hours of the day).  
 
Crucially for the topic of body representation, the representational content of the model 
includes, in addition to the states of the world external to the agent, the agent’s own bodily 
states. That is, since the body is itself part of what gives rise to sensory input, the agent needs 
to infer the states of their own body and infer the policies for action that will drive bodily 
behavior. Here, the predictions generated from these representations can be mixed together, 
so as to represent interactions among causes that produce relatively abrupt changes in the 
sensory input (e.g., turning one’s head as one is also sitting in a moving bus, or having 
trouble getting into a pair of jeans due to both weight gain and shrinkage of the jeans). Being 
able to conjoin causes and take their interaction into account creates a better fit to the data 
and less prediction error overall. 
 
Representations in the model will tend to change in light of prediction error, but such revision 
is subject to maintenance of a balance between being openminded and closedminded. What 
determines this balance, and thereby which beliefs are more revisable than others is the 
precision of various beliefs (where precision is the inverse of the variance about the mean of 
the distribution or density in question). Precision can be thought of as how confident a 
particular prior belief is, where a very precise belief is more immune to revision than an 
imprecise belief, because it takes more evidence to overturn the confidence.  
 
Crucially, a predictive processing system also represents and keeps track of the expected 
precisions of the sensory input it comes across or samples, such that its learning rate (i.e., 
how quickly it changes its representations) can be determined by both how much it already 
robustly represents and how much it trusts the prediction error associated with some sensory 
input. The learning rate is also controlled by beliefs about state transitions in the environment 
(sometimes called environmental uncertainty), that is, how likely it is that a particular state 
may stay the same or change in a more or less predictable or volatile fashion. If state 
transitions are not very probable, then the environment is assumed to not be volatile, and 
there will be less need to question one’s current representations; in contrast, if the agent has a 
strong belief that some environment is volatile, then it should relinquish its current 
representations sooner, and seek out new knowledge. 
 
The internal generative model used in perceptual and active inference provides a whole-of-
organism perspective on predictive processing. This perspective implies that there is one, 
unified model, allowing the agent to operate in its expected states as a unitary, embodied 
agent, described by the model’s total set of prior beliefs at any given time. The shape of this 
model is determined by the causal structure of the environments the organism occupies, the 
internal bodily states of the agent, and the causal interactions between the causes in the 
external environment and in the body.  
 
On this account, mental representation emerges from what we would call a domain-general 
scheme of predictive processing. While this account explains how organisms come to 
represent the world (e.g., tea, tigers, and lottery tickets), it also explains how they come to 
represent their own bodies (e.g., limb position, body size, touch, glucose levels, heart rate, 
breath). This is because a generative model whose function it is to model the causes relevant 
for its sensory input (in order to reduce long-term surprise), inevitably ends up modelling 
bodily causes too.i The idea here is that sensory input caused through the body’s interactions 
with the environment (e.g., the sound of a bottle you dropped on the floor, or the visual input 
as you turn your head and glimpse your image in a mirror) will be best predicted if the model 
represents the body as one among the many causes in the world, which combine to produce 
one’s sensory input at any given time (e.g., “the bottle was slippery, my hands were a bit wet, 
and I am pretty clumsy”; “it was me who moved and caused the change in what I saw”). On 
the predictive processing account, then, body representation simply emerges as the agent 
attempts to keep minimising surprise as best it can. Of course, it follows that just as we can 
occasionally be wrong in our perceptual inference about the external world (e.g., when we 
experience illusions) we can form misrepresentations about our own bodily states.   
 
2. Body Representation and Domain Specificity 
 
To minimise surprise about our sensory input, our minds must represent our bodies, because, 
as described, our bodies are part of what produces our sensory input. Several chapters in this 
volume are dedicated to characterizing the functional role of the systems that produce these 
representations. An obvious way of describing their function is as tracking and encoding the 
body (de Vignemont, 2020a). However, we might ask whether this is the exclusive function 
of these systems? Put differently: are body representation systems domain-specific? We can 
specify that a system is domain-specific to the extent that “it has a restricted subject matter, 
that is, the class of objects and properties that it processes information about is circumscribed 
in a relatively narrow way” (Robbins, 2017). In the context of body representation, this 
entails that body representation systems are exclusively dedicated to processing information 
about the body (and perhaps some limited set of associated targets, such as tools that are 
currently in use or the immediate space surrounding the body). The contrasting view is one 
where body representations emerge from a domain-general system, responsible for tracking a 
considerably broader class of targets. 
 
While domain-specificity is a topic of debate in relation to other systems of representation—
e.g. language (Pinker, 1994), and social learning (Heyes and Pearce, 2015)—it has not yet 
received attention in the literature on body representation. Consequently, it is not clear to 
what extent the domain-specific view is held by researchers. References to systems whose 
“primary, or fundamental, function” (Goldman, 2012, p. 74) is to represent the body; to 
“distinct psychological function[s] subserving the orientation on the own body” (Poeck and 
Orgass, 1971, p. 255); or claims that “the brain evolved [a] dedicated mechanism specifically 
tuned to the body and its immediate surrounding” (de Vignemont, 2020b, p. 132) appear 
consistent with (if not positively in favour of) the view. However, our aim is not to dispute 
any particular account of the function of body representation systems, but to introduce a new 
way of conceiving of this function—by contrasting it with the domain-specific view. 
According to our view, body representations emerge from a highly domain-general scheme of 
prediction error minimisation.  
In the next section, we discuss behavioural evidence from two of the most studied 
domains of body representation: body size and body ownership. As we illustrate, results from 
these domains of research suggest that considerably complex inferential resources are 
brought to bear on the task of body representation. Such resources, we argue, are unlikely to 
be found in domain-specific body representation systems but are readily available in domain-
general systems of environmental modelling. In other words, only if body-representation 
emerges in a domain-general representational system would it be predicted that perceptual 
inference about the body can so seamlessly take onboard multiple, complex, non-body-
resources. 
 
3. Body Representations and Inferential Complexity  
 
3.1. Representation of Body Size 
 
Representations of body size exhibit considerable plasticity: they can be swiftly manipulated 
by exposing participants to misleading evidence about their own body. An example of this is 
the Pinocchio illusion. In this illusion, a vibrator is applied to participants’ bicep tendon, 
while they hold on to their nose with the same arm. This change in kinesthetic prediction 
error (consistent with the bending of the arm) causes an experienced elongation of the nose—
as one participant reported: “Oh my gosh, my nose is a foot long! I feel like Pinocchio” 
(Lackner, 1988, p. 284). It also causes changes in tactile judgment, suggestive of a change in 
tactile representation of body size (de Vignemont et al., 2005).  
 
Consider two recent variants of this illusion wherein auditory signals are manipulated to 
achieve the same effect. In one variant, participants were required to pull on the tip of their 
(occluded) right index finger, while listening to the sounds of rising, falling, or constant pitch 
(Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 2017). After just two seconds of exposure to the rising pitch sounds 
(accompanied by finger pulling), participants increased their estimates of finger size and 
reported an experienced increase in finger size. In the second variant, blindfolded participants 
were required to drop a ball onto a suspended nylon net (Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 2018). A 
transducer attached to the net triggered audio-tactile feedback, simulating the impact of the 
ball hitting the floor. This allowed experimenters to manipulate the delay between the 
dropping of the ball and the audio-tactile feedback of the ball hitting the floor, simulating the 
appropriate audio-tactile conditions under which the ball was dropped at taller heights. 
Following the illusion, participants reported an experienced change in height, increased their 
estimates of leg length, and exhibited difference in their step size—all indications of a change 
in represented body size. 
 
These illusions demonstrate that body representations are affected by signals that are not 
bodily in origin. In each case, the relevant signals were not only associated with non-bodily 
modalities (i.e. they were auditory, rather than somatic), but, more importantly, they 
conveyed information about body size via exceedingly indirect inferential routes. In the case 
of the first experiment, via the association between pitch shifting and motion along the 
vertical plane; in the second experiment, via expectations of surface collision based on the 
speed and trajectory of the ball, and the expected distance between its dropping and landing 
points.  
 
Consider how these results relate to the function of body representation systems. If the 
exclusive function of such systems is to track the body, it seems unlikely that body 
representations would be affected by such indirect and abstract inferential routes. In the case 
of pitch shifting feedback, for example, the relevant signals had no prior association with 
bodily properties: our bodies do not emit pitch shifting noises, during movement or 
otherwise. Responding to such information requires monitoring a vastly complex influx of 
sensory signals and matching these signals against an extensive store of learned associations. 
If a system was devoted specifically to the domain of body tracking then this would be a 
remarkably computationally inefficient way of doing so.ii  
 
In contrast, the predictive processing account of these illusions is less computationally 
inefficient. Body representation, on this view, is the upshot of an inference to the best 
explanation, which draws on all occurrent sensory evidence, as well as domain-general 
associations between that evidence and more abstract principles regarding environmental 
regularities. In this case, a crucial piece of the evidence includes the apparently non-
accidental simultaneity of the auditory and tactile/kinaesthetic input. Following basic insights 
about physical causation, the relevant inference is guided by the idea that such constant 
conjunction between two events indicates causation. Participants then infer the seemingly 
unique set of beliefs that can make sense of the situation, namely, beliefs that involve a 
sudden, dramatic, and unusual change in body size. It is unsurprising that such rich and 
complex inferential processing could emerge from a system whose task is to produce such 
inferences (and indeed any inferences that are best at minimising prediction error).  
 
3.2. Representation of Body Ownership 
 
Just as we experience the size and shape of our bodies, so too do we experience our bodies as 
belonging to (or constituting) ourselves. As in the case of representation of body size, careful 
manipulation of sensory signals can elicit changes in representation of the owned body (see: 
Ehrsson, this volume). A classic example of this is in the rubber hand illusion (RHI) 
(Botvinick and Cohen, 1998). In the standard setup of the illusion, participants’ (occluded) 
hands are stroked while, at the same time, they see a rubber hand being stroked 
(synchronously). Various combinations of such visuo-tactile/proprioceptive input tend to 
generate an experience that the felt touch is delivered on the rubber hand by the seen stroking 
tool. The illusion also tends to elicit reports of an experience of ownership towards the rubber 
hand, along with other responses, such as increased skin conductance when the rubber hand is 
threatened, suggesting that the rubber hand is represented as belonging to oneself.  
 
Early accounts of the rubber hand illusion posited a two-stage process involving multi-
sensory integration of congruent signals and a process wherein a sensory representation of the 
rubber hand is compared against and/or integrated into a representation of the body (de 
Vignemont, 2007; Manos Tsakiris, 2010; Carruthers, 2013). In contrast, the predictive 
processing explanation of this phenomenon appeals in the first instance to precision-weighted 
multisensory integration, where the expected precision of each sensory input is informed by 
the context (e.g., the excepted high acuity of the visual input in good lighting conditions); in 
normal conditions this would lead to veridical inferences of tactile sensation and body 
ownership. But in the rubber hand set-up, the normally well-performing model of the body 
persistently generates prediction error, due to the mismatch between the felt and seen tactile 
input. This leads to selection of another model of the body, incorporating the touch on the 
rubber hand, with a better fit to the incoming sensory input. The deciding factor in selecting 
between these two models is the strong prior belief, which is independent of the body-
specific domain, that synchronous inputs are caused by the things in the environment that are 
co-located in space and time. On this account, the illusion occurs because, despite its 
conceptual implausibility, “the rubber hand is mine” model is selected for because, in the 
situation, it better minimises surprise. 
 
Note that, according to this domain-general process of model selection, there is no limit on 
the factors that can contribute to a model’s superiority. Consequently, a model wherein the 
rubber hand looked realistic would, all things equal, be a better fit than a model where it did 
not. This accounts for how cues like the shape and orientation of the hand modulate the 
illusion (Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005). However, contrary to early accounts of the illusion, on 
the predictive processing account, none of these factors are necessary conditions for 
ownership: while numerous factors contribute to the fit of a model, their absence can be 
replaced with other forms of evidence (Litwin, 2018). This helps to explain the success of 
conceptually unusual variants of the illusion, involving ownership towards invisible arms 
(Guterstam et al., 2013) or non-hand-like objects, such as cardboard boxes (Hohwy and 
Paton, 2010). Such illusions violate prior beliefs about our bodies and the world, but, in each 
case, other forms of evidence win out over these inconsistencies. As we will show, more 
complicated variants of this illusion are also consistent with the domain generality of the 
predictive processing account. 
 
Several variations of the rubber hand illusion involve the manipulation of non-bodily signals. 
In one such variation, participants are immersed in a virtual reality air hockey environment 
and tasked with hitting a puck into a goal (Grechuta et al., 2019a). As in the previous 
example, this paradigm functions through manipulating audio feedback, creating an 
experimental condition exhibiting three kinds of incongruency: first, an auditory cue falsely 
reflecting performance (e.g., a sound of failure following success and vice versa); second, the 
sound of the hit occurring randomly (within 200–500 ms) before or after the collision; and 
third, the sound originating from a different location than the collision. This experiment 
discovered that participants experience a greater sense of ownership over the virtual hand in 
the congruent, compared to incongruent trials. This difference was evident in self-reported 
feeling towards the virtual hand, as well as other measures of a change in body 
representation, including a shift in the proprioceptive representation of hand location 
(towards the virtual hand) and an increase in galvanic skin response upon threat to the virtual 
hand.  
 
In a further extension of the paradigm (Grechuta et al., 2019b), the authors manipulated 
various task-irrelevant environmental features in order to increase incongruence. They 
manipulated the spatial orientation of audience benches (rotating them on the z-axis); the 
spatial orientation of a clock (modulating the velocity and direction of the arrows); the 
position of the sun; and background sounds (to mimic a concert, or cinema). As before, 
ownership measures were significantly higher in congruent conditions, compared to 
incongruent.  
 
The predictive processing account of body representation supplies a straightforward 
explanation for these results: because body representation emerges from a general scheme of 
environmental modelling, the processes that underpin sense of bodily ownership are expected 
to be sensitive to expectations about the environment. As the researchers themselves put it, 
“similar to any robust percept, body ownership depends on the consistency of the internal 
models of not only the body or the consequences of its actions but also the model of the 
surrounding environment” (ibid., p. 10). In the case of the incongruent condition, the 
environment was represented as less trustworthy, so incoming prediction errors were 
consequently represented with less precision, and therefore were less efficacious in 
improving the fit of the “the virtual hand is mine” model. 
 
As before, these results appear at odds with the domain-specific view. The aforementioned 
studies demonstrate that the systems that underpin representation of body ownership are 
sensitive to highly abstract cues regarding the general reliability of information emerging 
from an environment. As before, monitoring non bodily related, abstract features of the 
environment—such as the functionality of clocks or the spatial orientation of benches— 
would be considerably computationally inefficient for a system exclusively dedicated to 
tracking the body. If, however, expectations about such environmental features are already 
encoded in the generative model, then those expectations can be swiftly deployed for the task 
of inferring which feature of that environment belongs to the self.  
 
Finally, consider behavioural results suggesting that the strength of ownership reports in the 
rubber hand illusion are predicted by participants’ hypnotic suggestibility (Lush et al., 2020). 
In response to these results, some have suggested a different mechanism to explain the 
characteristic phenomenology of the rubber hand illusion, where top-down 
‘phenomenological control’ through suggestion (via the experimental set-up), rather than a 
shift in body representation, drives the change in bodily experience. This presents its own 
domain-general explanation, where the relevant processes do not function to represent the 
body whatsoever. Such a finding is, however, also consistent with the predictive processing 
account of bodily ownership, which leaves room for multiple top-down influences on 
perceptual inference, via the organism’s rich web of priors regarding the world. For example, 
it may be that model selection or prior precisions are modulated when suggestion (hypnotic 
or otherwise) creates a context of uncertainty. Again, this underscores the flexibility and 




Predictive processing accounts of cognition are the natural upshot of a necessary condition on 
existence: the minimisation of surprise. In this chapter, we introduced body representation 
from this perspective. We illustrated how body representation emerges from a domain-
general scheme of prediction error minimisation, contrasting it with the idea of domain-
specific, functionally exclusive body representation systems. We illustrated the advantages of 
predictive processing in terms of explaining behavioural results related to representation of 
body size and ownership. We finish here by discussing some implications of the proposed 
view, in terms of researching body representation. 
 
An important upshot of the proposed account is that body representation depends on 
inferences regarding complex relations between environmental regularities. In some cases, 
these relations are highly abstract, such as the relationship between pitch shifting and 
movement trajectories. This invites researchers to look more closely at how body 
representations can be modified by manipulating signals regarding environmental regularities 
pertaining to precision and volatility over several time scales and including multiple domains 
(for examples and review, see, e.g., Limanowski and Friston, 2020; Perrykkad et al., 2021; 
Smith et al., 2021). Thus, to further our understanding of body representation we should turn 
our focus away from exclusively manipulating bodily signals, towards integration of more 
abstract environmental cues (as some researchers have begun to do). In a similar vein, we can 
understand how misrepresentation of the body occurs—in both pathological and non-
pathological contexts—by focusing on how misrepresentation of the environment occurs. An 
example of this is found in research demonstrating that distortions that were traditionally 
assumed to be unique to proprioceptive representations of body size (Longo and Haggard, 
2010) extend to representation of various environmental objects (specifically, those with 
which we interact) (Peviani et al., 2021). 
 
There are various further insights to draw from the predictive processing literature, to better 
understand body representation. For example, there is considerable research into the 
representational formats employed to model environmental causes, via the surprise 
minimisation scheme (Gładziejewski, 2016; Kiefer and Hohwy, 2018). Such insights may 
help to inform proposals regarding the format and philosophical legitimacy of body 
representation (Gadsby and Williams, 2018; Alsmith, 2019). Further, there is a rich body of 
research devoted to understanding representation of the self within a predictive processing 
framework (Hohwy and Michael, 2017; Letheby and Gerrans, 2017). Such accounts may be 
used to understand the link between representation of the body and more abstract 
representations of the self. In turn, we might understand disorders that involve both 
misrepresentation of the body and disordered representation of the self, such as anorexia 
nervosa (Gadsby, 2017; Keizer & Engel, this volume), as well as the apparent link between 
bodily illusions, like the rubber hand illusion, and more abstract beliefs about the self (Krol et 
al., 2020). However, to reap these explanatory benefits, researchers must first embrace the 
view that body representation emerges from a predictive processing system that is domain-
general rather than domain-specific.    
 
 
i The distinction we have drawn here is not between nativism and empiricism. Organisms may begin with some 
set of very precise homeostatic (i.e. innate) priors (or set points) that specify the states they expect to find 
themselves (e.g., heart rate, glucose levels, body temperature). Such priors, in virtue of their high precision, may 
therefore constrain the states in which the body is represented as being in.  
ii This relates to the claim that domain-specific systems are computationally efficient in virtue of being 
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